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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order dated October 6, 1993, granting a
summary judgment in favor of Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as "Savage") which required Bruce A. Boyd (hereinafter referred to
as "Boyd") to indemnify and defend Savage against Boyd's claims presented in
the complaint below, and against the plaintiffs' claims in a related action
Robert J. Kane, Jr. and Beverly Kane v. J. R. Simplot Company and
Scaffold & Equipment

Savage

Inc., pending in the United States District Court of

Utah. An order of the Third District Court dated May 25, 1994, directed that
its October 6, 1993 order be considered a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and determined t h a t the claims for
indemnification against Boyd are separate and distinct from all pending
claims. (R. 178-179) The trial court's order is appealed as of right pursuant to
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue:

Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment in

favor of Savage on the grounds that the form small print indemnity clause
found on the back of the scaffolding Rental Delivery not only released Savage
from liability for its own negligence, but also required Boyd to pay all costs of
defense and indemnification for any claims arising out of the use of the rented
equipment.

1

Standard:

"To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence,

admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the [nonmoving party], m u s t show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and
that the [moving party] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Such

showing m u s t preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable possibility that the
[non-moving party] could win if given a trial." Frederick May & Company

v.

Dunn, 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962).
Summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, depositions,
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983).
The district court's conclusion of law is reviewed for correctness by the
appellate court.

State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990).

"Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, no deference
is due the trial court's determination of the issues presented."

Higgins v. Salt

Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Plaintiff/appellant Boyd appeals from a s u m m a r y judgment entered
against him and in favor of defendant/appellee Savage which determined that
a "defend and indemnify" provision in a document Boyd initialed when he
picked u p rental scaffolds not only bars Boyd's claim against Savage but also
requires him to pay all of Savage's defense costs and attorney's fees in this
2

action and a pending U.S. District Court action, Kane v. Simplot, to which
Boyd is not a party.
Boyd was hired by J. R. Simplot Company (hereinafter referred to as
"Simplot") to paint a silo owned by Simplot. Boyd, who sometimes contracts
to do painting and had done business with Savage in the past, picked u p the
scaffolding from Savage and initialed a document entitled Sky Climber Rental
Delivery (hereinafter "Rental Delivery", a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A"), which contained a hidden defend and indemnify "agreement."
Boyd and a fellow worker, Robert J. Kane, Jr., were seriously injured
when the scaffolding failed and they plunged 60 feet to the ground.

Boyd

brought this action claiming that Savage negligently failed to direct, instruct
and warn him adequately with respect to the use of the scaffolding equipment.
Robert Kane and his wife filed a similar action in U.S. District Court.
Savage answered and counterclaimed on July 2, 1993. It denied liability
and asserted t h a t the rental agreement Boyd initialed contained

an

indemnification clause, having the effect of barring all of Boyd's claims
asserted against Savage in the present action and requiring Boyd to
indemnify it for any liability on the claims asserted by Robert and Beverly
Kane against it in the U.S. District Court action. In addition, Savage asserted
that the indemnification clause required Boyd to pay all costs and attorney's
fees incurred by Savage in defending both actions
The indemnification clause at issue is found hidden in Savage's
standardized form Rental Delivery in fine print inside a two-sheet document

3

which is sealed closed at the top and the bottom of the sheets.

The

indemnification clause can only be reviewed if the sheets are separated by
tearing off a perforated strip at the bottom.

It is difficult to read and is

crowded onto the page with 24 other technical provisions.
When Boyd picked up the scaffolds, a representative of Savage inspected
the equipment and reviewed with Boyd the "suspended scaffold pre-operation
check-off list" set out on the back, or outside, of the joined sheets of the
Rental Delivery. The indemnification clause is not found on the pre-operation
check-off list, which is much easier to read, has larger print and is accessible
without separating the sheets.

The check-off list is on the outside of the

sheets in plain sight and is much more noticeable t h a n the 25 technical
provisions, including the indemnification provision.

The Savage employee

reviewed only the check-off list with Mr. Boyd.
On August 12, 1994, Savage moved the court for summary judgment
requiring Boyd to defend and indemnify Savage in both this and the U.S.
District Court actions and to pay all attorney's fees incurred as a result
thereof.

That motion was opposed by Boyd.

The trial court reviewed the

memoranda and heard argument on September 13, 1993. The court received
supplemental memoranda on September 15, 1993. The trial court determined
t h a t there was "no evidence that the scaffolding was leased on a take-it-orleave-it b a s i s or t h a t plaintiff occupied a disadvantageous

4

bargaining

position" and ruled in its minute entry of September 16, 1993 in favor of
Savage. A court stamped copy is attached as Exhibit "B". l
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On May 24, 1993, Boyd's attorney, Daniel Gibbons, filed a

complaint against Savage and Simplot. (R. 2-9)
2.

Boyd's second cause of action sounded in negligence against

Savage.

Boyd alleged that Savage was negligent in the design and the

selection of the equipment rented and sold to Boyd. Boyd further alleged that
Savage was negligent in failing to adequately direct, instruct and warn Boyd
of the inherent dangers and the proper method for and use of the swing stage
and equipment. (R. 7-8)
3.

On July 2, 1994, Savage filed an answer and counterclaim against

Boyd. (R. 38-45)
4.

Savage's counterclaim sought indemnification from Boyd based on

the Rental Delivery document initialed by Boyd which contained

an

indemnification clause. (R. 43-44)
5.

On July 2 1 , 1993, Boyd filed a reply to Savage's counterclaim. (R.

6.

On August 12, 1993, Savage filed its motion for s u m m a r y

26-30)

judgment

(R. 63-64), and its memorandum in support of its motion for

summary judgment. (R. 65-76)

This document was not included in the indexed record.

5

7.

On August 27, 1993, Boyd filed his memorandum in opposition to

Savage's motion for summary judgment. (R. 86-91)
8.

Boyd had rented equipment from Savage on approximately 15

occasions. (R. 92)
9.

The Rental Delivery h a s always been filled out by Savage

employees. (R. 93)
10.

On May 17, 1991, when Boyd signed the Rental Delivery, a Savage

employee told him where to initial the form.
11.

(R. 93)

Boyd was not instructed to read or review any of the provisions

on the Rental Delivery. (R. 93)
12.

Boyd was never told there were additional contract terms on the

back of the sheets of the form. (R. 93)
13.

Boyd never had a discussion with anyone at Savage in which the

indemnification provisions of the Rental Delivery were addressed. (R. 93)
14.

Boyd was told by Savage employees t h a t the Rental Delivery

stated that if he lost or damaged the rental equipment he would be required
to replace it. (R. 93)
15.

There was no other discussion regarding any of the terms on the

Rental Delivery. (R. 93)
16.

The Rental Delivery initialed by Boyd on May 17, 1991, appeared

to Boyd to be a form contract. (R. 93)
17.

There was no discussion of the terms on the front or back of the

Rental Delivery. (R. 93)
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18.

The copy of the Rental Delivery Boyd received consisted of two

sheets. The sheets were joined at the top and bottom. The two sheets Boyd
received consisted of sheets 3 and 4 of a four-sheet form. (R. 93)
19.

In the lower court, Boyd set forth the following "Statement of

Facts" in his Memorandum in Opposition.
1.
Paragraph 6 of the defendant's statement of
facts is incorrect. The initialing on the front of the
defendant's form rental agreement does not indicate that
the plaintiff read and agreed to the indemnity provision of
paragraph 15. The initialing is in regard to paragraph 16.
(See rental agreement.)
2.
The rental agreement is a form contract prepared
by Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as "Savage") without input from or negotiation with the
individuals to whom they rent equipment.
3.
The plaintiff never had a discussion with any
individual at Savage with regard to the terms of the
indemnity provision found on two of the back sheets of the
four page contract. (See Boyd's affidavit, paragraphs 9 and
11.)
4.
The indemnity provision is not clearly presented
to the renter of the equipment in that it is hidden on back
sheets inside the four page document. (An exemplar of the
contract will be brought for the court's review at the time of
the oral argument. The defendant has refused to provide
additional exemplars to the plaintiff.)
In its Reply Memorandum, Savage objected only to paragraph 3, stating:
Savage objects to plaintiffs statement of facts as contained
in his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Specifically, Savage objects to the
following paragraphs as numbered by plaintiff.
Paragraph 3. Savage objects to this statement of fact as
wholly irrelevant, such being extrinsic, parol evidence which
7

should not be considered by this court as will be discussed
more fully below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Savage is attempting to enforce an onerous "defend and indemnify"
provision.

Not only is the provision oppressive, it is difficult to locate and

read. The provision is within a Rental Delivery document prepared by Savage
and apparently the Scaffold Industry Association. The terms can be found on
the back sheets within the "sealed" document. The printing on the back sheets
which contain numerous provisions crowed together are nearly illegible.
When the facts and inferences surrounding Boyd's initialing of the
Rental Delivery are viewed in the light most favorable to Boyd, sufficient
evidence exists to find that the adhesion type Rental Delivery was presented
to Boyd in a take-it-or-leave-it m a n n e r and t h a t Boyd, when compared to
Savage, was the weaker party.

Boyd had no opportunity to negotiate the

terms which Savage desires to force upon its customers. Certainly, the "defend
and indemnify" clause was not assented to by Boyd and should not be
enforced against him.
The provision in question should not be enforced against Boyd because
of its oppressive and overreaching terms and especially in light of the
deceptive m a n n e r in which Savage is attempting to bind its customers.
Unconscionable t e r m s which unfairly surprise the c o n s u m e r are not
enforceable.

8

ARGUMENT
I
THE INDEMOTFICATION CLAUSE HIDDEN WITHIN THE RENTAL DELIVERY
DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE PARTIES1 "CIRCLE OF ASSENT"
AND IS NOT ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE CUSTOMER

At the time Boyd rented the scaffolding equipment that failed, he was
one of Savage's many customers. His own business was a sole proprietorship
and Boyd was the only employee. At the time the scaffolding failed, Boyd and
Robert Kane were the only workers on the job. (Amended Complaint of Kane
v. Simplot and Savage

attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and cited by Savage in

its memorandum supporting its motion for summary judgment.)
It is very important for this court to closely examine an actual exemplar
of the Rental Delivery.

2

It is a four sheet document used by Savage as an

equipment discharge sheet and a suspended scaffold pre-operation check-off
list. The first sheet is blue, the second sheet is green, the third is yellow and
the back sheet is white. The blue and green sheets are retained by Savage and
two yellow and white sheets are given to the customer. The blue and green
sheets are joined to the yellow and white by a "glue" and are easily peeled off.
The yellow and white sheets are joined together at the bottom and the top and
cannot be separated (and the back cannot be read) without tearing off a
perforated strip at the bottom.

The first blue sheet that Savage keeps is

2

Boyd desires to attach an exemplar of the Rental Delivery in the appendix. Savage submitted such an exemplar to
the trial court. (R. 109-112) Savage has refused Boyd's request to produce sufficient exemplars to this court so that
each judge deciding this matter may have an exemplar for his or her personal review. Accordingly, Boyd has attached
an exemplar in his original appendix and photocopies in the copies of his appendix. The Rental Delivery has twosided print and the deceptive nature of the document cannot be appreciated merely from photocopies. The
photocopies in the record, however, do show how difficult the back side of the sheets are to read which contain the
indemnification clause.

9

identical front and back to the first yellow sheet given to the customer. The
front of each h a s the words "Lessee will defend and indemnify Lessor
(paragraph 15)". Paragraph 15, however, cannot be found without tearing off
the perforated strip, and once it is found, it is difficult to read. The pages are
very thin and the information provided on the front sheet of pages 1 and 3 is
printed on a much heavier type set than the information provided on the back.
Of course, the indemnification clause is only found on the back sides of sheets
1 and 3. The print on the front of sheets 1 and 3 bleeds out the information,
including the indemnity clause, on the back of those sheets.
Without removing the perforated strip, and there are no instructions to
do so, the check-off list appears to be the only item on the "reverse side" of the
Rental Delivery. The Rental Delivery lacks the most fundamental of contract
provisions. There is no mention of the length of time the rented equipment
will be in possession of the customer, no hint as to of the method of payment,
if any, and no indication of the price of the rented or purchased equipment. It
can hardly be said that the Rental Delivery is a contract setting forth the
parties' completed agreement.
It is well recognized that companies such as Savage use pre-printed form
d o c u m e n t s to take away the bargaining power of their

customers.

Additionally, oppressive terms, such as the indemnification clause in question,
are frequently hidden on the back sheets, in fine print and on paper which
makes the printing nearly illegible. There can be little doubt that Boyd would
not have agreed to indemnify and defend Savage against any claims relating
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to Savage's negligence or even products liability, arising out of Boyd's proper
use of the scaffolding equipment. Section 211 of the Restatement of Contracts,
Second,

addresses

oppressive

conditions

hidden within

pre-printed

standardized forms. Paragraph 3 of Section 211 states:
Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew t h a t
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part
of the agreement.
(Emphasis added.) Comments b and f of Section 211 are particularly
instructive when considering the case at hand. Comment b states in part:
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to
understand or even read the standard terms. One of the
purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over
details of individual transactions, and that purpose would
not be served if a substantial number of customers retained
counsel and reviewed the s t a n d a r d terms. Employees
regularly u s i n g a form often have only a limited
understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary
them. Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or
even read the standard terms.
Comment f states in part:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing
to know the standard terms and details, they are not bound
to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
expectation.
(Emphasis added.)
Karl Llewellyn in a discussion regarding the notion of assent as applied
to a standardized form stated:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boilerplate clauses, we
can recognize that so far as it concerns the specific, there is
no assent at all. What h a s in fact been assented to,
11

specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type
of the transaction, and b u t one thing more, that one thing
more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his
form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms.
K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, 370 (1960). The terms that Savage is
trying to enforce upon Boyd are unreasonable and indecent. They clearly alter
the "reasonable meaning of the dickered terms."
The affidavit of Boyd is in the record without rebuttal. (R. 92-94) At the
time the Rental Delivery was initialed by Boyd and checked by a Savage
employee, the only terms appearing on the Rental Delivery were the quantity
and identification of items to be rented and purchased. The Rental Delivery
does not fully set forth

the agreement between the p a r t i e s .

The

indemnification provisions of the Rental Delivery were not discussed by Boyd
and the Savage employee.

(R. 93) In fact, the only terms on the Rental

Delivery that were discussed were the provisions that Boyd was responsible
for lost or damaged rental equipment. (R. 93) Boyd was given sheets 3 and 4
of the Rental Delivery and those sheets were sealed at the top and the bottom.
(R. 93)
In Weaver v. American

Oil Company,

257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E. 2d 144

(1971), a lease by an oil company to an individual was reviewed. The lessee
signed the lease without reading it. One of its provisions required the lessee
to indemnify the lessor for damages caused by the lessor's negligence. It was
held that the lessee was not obligated to read the lease because "the clause

12

was in fine print and contained no title heading ... ." Id., at 462, 276 N.E. 2d
at 147. The court went on to state:
The party seeking to enforce such a contract has the burden
of showing that the provisions were explained to the other
party and came to his knowledge and there was in fact a
real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an
objective meeting.
Id. at 464, 276 N.E.2d at 148. In the case at hand, there was no real and
voluntary meeting of the minds between Boyd and Savage.

The Rental

Delivery can hardly be considered to be a contract between the parties with
the omission of the most basic terms necessary for a rental/sales agreement,
and it is clear that the language of the indemnity clause was not brought to
Boyd's attention.
In the case of Parton v. Pirtle Oldsmobile - Cadillac - Isuzu, 730 S.W.2d
634 (Tenn. App. 1987), the court examined the "efficacy of an exculpatory
provision in a pre-printed automobile repair order signed by the owner of the
automobile." Id. at 635. The automoble owner sued an automobile repair shop
for the shop's alleged negligence in allowing the automobile to be stolen. The
exculpatory provision in Parton

is less offensive t h a n the indemnification

clause at issue here when the location of the terms in the document and the
extent of the obligation imposed on the customer are compared. The Parton
clause is found on the front of the repair order immediately above the
customer's signature, while the Savage clause is hidden within the sealed
portion of the document. The Parton clause merely attempts to relieve the
repair shop from liability for its own negligence while the Savage clause

13

a t t e m p t s to b a r liability and add the affirmative duty of defense and
indemnity for all claims, including third-party claims.
In its decision, the Parton

court set forth the modern doctrine of fair

play to be applied in contract interpretation and in the determination of the
"circle of assent" which contains the agreement of the parties. One of those
authorities cited stated:
It m u s t be emphasized t h a t the a s s e n t analysis is not
premised upon the actual assent of the parties. Parties to a
contract rarely consciously advert to any number of terms
which are binding upon them. If such terms allocate the
risks of the bargain in a manner which the parties should
have reasonably expected, they are enforceable — they are,
to use the expression of Karl Llewellyn, 'decent' terms. If the
terms of the contract suggest a reallocation of material risks,
an attempted reallocation may be so extreme that regardless
of appearance and genuine assent, a court will not enforce
it. However, in less extreme situations, the parties may
reallocate the risks of their bargain and such a reallocation
will be judicially sanctioned if there is both apparent and
genuine assent to it The parties will not be found to have
agreed to an abnormal allocation of risks if the only
evidence thereof is an inconspicuous provision and the
boilerplate of the s t a n d a r d form. At a minimum, the
reallocation must be physically conspicuous. Beyond that,
it m u s t have been manifested in a fashion comprehensible to
the party against whom it is sought to be enforced. Finally,
such party must have had a reasonable choice in relation to
such reallocation. Absent these safeguards, the reallocation
m u s t be disregarded by courts since to enforce the provision
evidencing it would be to enforce an 'indecent' provision.
The provision is raised to the level of decency only if the
party against whom it will operate h a s apparently and
genuinely assented to be bound thereby.
Id. at 637, citing J. Murray, On Contracts,
(italics in original).

14

§352-353, 2d Rev. Ed. (1974)

Requiring Boyd to be responsible for the negligent acts of Savage which
resulted in injuries to Boyd and Kane is an "abnormal allocation of risks."
Additionally, t h a t abnormal allocation of risks is only found in
"inconspicuous provision in the boilerplate of the standard form."

an

Parton

requires that the indemnification clause at issue be (1) physically conspicuous,
(2) manifested in a fashion comprehensible to Boyd and (3) give Boyd a
reasonable choice in relation to the reallocation of risk.

None of the three

requirements is met in this case.
II
THE UNBARGAINED-FOR TERMS OF THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE ARE
UNCONSCIONABLE AND SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED

It is common knowledge t h a t the detail provisions of standardized
contracts are seldom read by consumers. Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985,
992 (Colo. 1986). It is also well-recognized by courts and commentators that
companies such as Savage attempted to hide oppressive clauses in a prolix
printed form drafted by that company. As a result of such practices, the courts
have developed the doctrine of unconscionability. The Utah Supreme Court
stated:
'Unconscionable' is a term that defies precise definition.
Rather, the court m u s t assess the circumstances of each
particular case in light of the twofold purpose of the
doctrine, prevention of oppression and of unfair surprise.
Recognition of the purposes h a s lead to a n analysis of
unconscionability in terms of 'substantive' and 'procedural'
unconscionability. 'Substantive unconscionability' examines
the relative fairness of the obligations assumed. 'Procedural
unconscionability' focuses on the manner in which the

15

contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the
parties.
Resource Management

Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company, 706

P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). When a claim for unconscionability is raised,
this court will "examine the facts ... in the light of the purposes of the
unconscionability doctrine, i.e., prevention of oppression and of unfair
surprise.' " Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah App. 1988).
PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY

"While unconscionability is ultimately a question of law, n u m e r o u s
factual inquiries bear upon that question." A. & M. Produce Co. v. F.M.C., 186
Cal. Rptr. 114, 123 (App. 1982). The trial court determined that there was no
evidence, one way or the other, regarding the Rental Delivery being presented
in a take-it-or-leave-it m a n n e r or t h a t Boyd was in a disadvantageous
bargaining position with Savage.

(Exhibit "B") That determination by the

lower court, standing alone, should require this case to be remanded so that
such facts could be discovered.

3

An examination of the Rental Delivery and

the u n r e b u t t e d affidavit of Boyd clearly shows t h a t Boyd was "unfairly
surprised" by the terms of the indemnification clause.

Boyd was totally

unaware of that clause at the time the blanks on the Rental Delivery were

3

Moreover, the fact that Savage presents an elaborate printed form to its customers, deals with individual customers
such as Boyd, and uses the Rented Delivery to educate its customers in the use of the scaffolds and to embody many
other contractual terms that appear necessary in such a business — all show that the lower court was wrong: there is
some evidence from the circumstances of this transaction itself from which it can be inferred that Savage's employees
could not bargain with the "defend and indemnify" provision and that Boyd had to take it or leave it. If such an
inference is at all reasonable, it must be drawn on a motion for summary judgment, see e.g., Frederick May &
Company v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962).
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filled out and there was no real negotiation over the terms hidden in the
Rental Delivery.
In the A &MProduce

case, the court examined a contract for the sale of

a weight-sizing machine.

The consumer was a large scale Imperial Valley

farming enterprise. When the consumer purchased the machine, it signed a
contract which contained a warranty disclaimer. The disclaimer appeared "in
the middle of the back page of a long pre-printed form contract which was
only casually shown" to the consumer. Id. at 124. The consumer never read
the warranty disclaimer and the disclaimer was never pointed out to the
consumer by the seller. The contract terms were standard and the consumer
was never made aware of the option to negotiate those terms. "The sum total
of these circumstances leads to the conclusion t h a t this contract was a
'bargain' only in the most general sense of the word." Id. at 125. The facts of
the case at issue closely parallel the procedural unconscionability of the A &
M Produce case.
In the case of Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013
(Ariz. 1992), the Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed a one page document
entitled on its face, "agreement to arbitrate", which was intended to require an
individual to arbitrate her potential claims for malpractice against a physician
and forego her right to bring that action in the courts. A photocopy of the
document in question is found as Appendix A to the printed opinion. There
was no deception in the presentation or format of the document and the
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plaintiff could not argue "unfair surprise." The Supreme Court of Arizona,
however, found that the waiver was a contract of adhesion.
An adhesion contract is typically a standardized form
offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a
'take-it-or-leave-it' basis without affording the consumer a
realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions
t h a t the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or
services except by acquiescence in the form contract.
Id. at 1015 (citations omitted)
In the Broemmer

case, the plaintiff was a 21 year-old woman, 16 or 17

weeks pregnant. She and her mother went to Abortion Services of Phoenix
where she was asked to complete three forms.

The forms were a two page

consent to operate, a questionnaire and the one page agreement to arbitrate at
issue. The agreement to arbitrate is much easier to read and comprehend than
the Rental Delivery; however, the presentation of the agreement to arbitrate by
the clinic to the patient was very similar to the presentation to the Rental
Delivery by Savage to Boyd. The Rental Delivery meets all of the conditions
necessary to consider it a contract of adhesion.
SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY

The second aspect of the unconscionability doctrine prevents oppression.
The indemnification clause in the Rental Delivery gives an extremely lopsided
advantage to Savage. Savage is attempting to place the responsibility for even
latent defects in its equipment onto its customers.
From a social perspective, risk of loss is most appropriately
borne by a party best able to prevent its occurrence,
(citations omitted) Rarely would the buyer be in a better
position t h a n the manufacturer - seller to evaluate the
performance characteristics of a machine.
18

A & M Produce Co. at 125. It is also clear in the case at h a n d that Boyd
would not be in a better position to evaluate the quality of the scaffolding
t h a n Savage.

As such, the terms of t h e indemnification clause are

"inconsistent with accepted mores of commercial practice." Jones at 40.
The facts in the instant case present even stronger arguments in favor of
holding the Rental Delivery unenforceable t h a n do the facts in either the
Broemmer

or A & M Produce cases. The seller of the weight-sizing machine

attempted to exclude consequential damages incurred as a result of the
machine's failure to operate properly. In the case at hand, Savage not only
desires to be free from liability for its equipment's failures b u t also to shift the
burden to defend it against claims by third-parties upon its customers.
In the Broemmer

case, the plaintiff was only precluded from her choice

of forums to which she could t u r n for relief.

The burden on Boyd is far

greater. If the indemnification clause were to be upheld by this court, Boyd
would have no forum to which he could turn for relief. Additionally, he would
be required to stand in the shoes of Savage to pay for Kane's damages, the
costs of litigation and Savage's attorneys' fees.

Boyd, in this case, is an

innocent party and the indemnification clause imposes "an overall imbalance
in rights and responsibilities" by Savage upon its customers. Jones

at 40.

Boyd urges this court to refuse to enforce the offensive results of the Rental
Delivery, a pre-printed form equipment check-off list which contains hidden
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non-negotiated and oppressive terms.

CONCLUSION
Although Boyd could have taken all four sheets of the Rental Delivery
to legal counsel for advice on whether the document contained any significant
reallocation of risk hidden within its nearly illegible sheets, this court should
not justify such sharp and deceptive business practices when all of the facts
surrounding the initialing of the Rental Delivery are examined at the time
Boyd picked u p the scaffolding.

Each fact and inference m u s t be viewed in

the light most favorable to Boyd and in an effort to prevent oppression and
unfair surprise. Based on the foregoing, Boyd urges this court to reverse the
trial court and hold that the "defend and indemnify clause" is unenforceable.
DATED this 10th day of November, 1994.
DUNN & DU

MARK DALTON DUNN
J. RAND HIRSCHI
KEVIN D. SWENSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

4

Savage's attempt to shift to its customers all risks of any nature arising from its own fault also violates the strong
public policy embodied in the Tort Reform Act of 1986 as amended in 1993 (§78-27-38 through 43, Utah Code
Ann.) and recognized in the Utah Supreme Court's opinion of Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah
1993): All persons, not immune, whose fault contributed to an injury are responsible for their share of fault but
only for their share. This strong public policy should militate against the extreme reallocation that Savage attempts
in its Rental Delivery document. See Brown v. Boyer-Washington Blvd. Associates, 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993)
(indemnification provision did no more than state Utah comparative fault law and would not be used to shift all
liability to sub-contractor.)
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Tab A

IC SECURITY PRINTERS. INC. (801) 973-6555

SKY CLIMBER RENTAL DELIVERY

iJA

SAVAGElScaHold & Equipment Co.
728 West 2nd South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
phone

Sales and Rental

(801) 359-8635

WVT1TBT

[^0.

n,

EXHIBIT

Leased to

Date

Address

Job Number

SCAFFOLD
INDUSTRY
/^SSDCATION
1940

. . A "1
"A

Customer's Order No.
Job

This Agreement Terminates: Date

Ship Via

Vehicle License Number

DESCRIPTION

|" RECEIVED | RETURNED 1

OATE

|

SKY CLIMBERS

1

POWER CLIMBERS

|

LAHOS

J

SKY LOCKS

1

STIRRUPS

1

SERIAL NUMBER

19_

T

innruniMni

Count equipment received. Customer liable for
eauipment not returned.
HANDLE WIRE ROPE PROPERLY CUSTOMER WILL BE
CHARGED FOR THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF WIRE ROPE IF
ANY PART IS DAAAAGED.
CAUTION: SET FOR
VOLTS
USE ONLY n 10-3 ELECTRIC CABLE
D LIFE LINES AND SAFETY BELTS DECLINED WILL
SUPPLY OWN EQUIPMENT.
/ / /
INITIAL

WORK CAGES

|

DEMOUNTABLE WORK CAGES

|

BOSUN CHAIRS

|

ROLLER BUMPERS

|

•

LESSEE HAS INSPECTED "LEASED EQUIPMENT" AND WILL

•

WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED
(SEE PARAGRAPH 5)

WIRE ROPES

|

WIRE ROPES

|

WIRE ROPES TIEBACKS

]

SEE REVERSE SIDE WHICH PROVIDES THAT

ELECTRIC CABLES
ELECTRIC CABLES

| • LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15)

| |

ELECTRIC YOKES
•
ELECTRIC 110 ADAPTERS

LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
SAFETY REGULATIONS BY ALL PERSONS (PARAGRAPH 16)

GUARD RAILS

I • LESSEE HAS RECEIVED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, IS
FAMILIAR WITH EQUIPMENTS SAFE USE, AND WILL MAKE
SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS AVAILABLE AT JOB LOCA-

GUARD RAILS

I

SKY CLIMBER GUARD RAIL POSTS

TION (PARAGRAPH 16) X

I I

/ / /
(

II
SIGNATURE

AND OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS — READ IT!
J-CLAMPS
THIMBLES
SHACKLES

CORNICE HOOKS
PARAPET CLAMPS
ALUM " 1 " BEAMS

I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE
AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
RECEIPT BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER
OR OTHER AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY
CONSTITUTE LESSEES AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE
PARAGRAPH 20).

(

/ /

RECEIPT OF ABOVE EQUIPMENT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED

STEEL " 1 " BEAMS
LONGHORN ASSEMBLY

Count Accepted By
SIGNATURE OF LESSEE OR AUTHORIZED AGENT

COUNTERWEIGHTS

ALUMINUM PLANK
ALUMINUM PLANK

ALL EQUIPMENT USED AT YOUR O W N RISK

Checli:ed By

f
[

^

/

IF EQUIPMENT DOES NOT WORK PROPERLY. NOTIFY OFFICE AT ONCE.
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INSURANCE:

Lessee shall keep the equiorrient insured against all risks ot loss pr damage f r o m every cause whatsoever tor not 'ess than the full replacement value thereo:. and shall

carry comprehensive puoiir: liability ana property damage insurance with contractual liability, but lessee's failure to have *uch InSi.-^.ue sr.att ,-iOt i^»ie<. iav.ee s cuiujanons harem.
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SKY CLIMBER RENTAL DELIVERY

SCAFFOLD

Scaffold & Equipment Co.
728 West 2nd South

NO. 1940

Salt Lake City, I Ilah 84104
phone

Sales and Rental

££gT R Y
^SQOCM"ION

( 801 » 359-8635

EXHIBIT "A"

Leased to _
Address
' o ' *er \ O ' d e r N o .

,_

Job

: Aureenr>~--t T, -minotesi D a t e ,

Ship Via .

h'•-'• - : . *-. -• e N -i'nber _ _ __ __.

DESCRIPTION

\ RECEIVED | RETURNED!

SERIAL NUMBER

F

U l D A D T A Ik I T

DATE

SKY CLIMBERS

Count e q u i p m e n t r e c e i v e d .
equipment not returned.

|

[

SKY LOCKS

[

STIRRUPS

1

.
WORK CAGES

Customer

liable for

HANDLE WIRE ROPE PROPERLY CUSTOMER WILL BE
CHARGED FOR THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF WIRE ROPE IF
ANY PART IS DAAAAGED
CAUTION: SET FOR
VOLTS
USE ONLY H 10-3 ELECTRIC CABLE
D LIFE LINES AND SAFETY BELTS DECLINED WILL
SUPPLY OWN EQUIPMENT.
/ / /

POWER CLIMBERS
LAHOS

J9

INITIAL

|

DEMOUNTABLE WORK CAGES

SEE REVERSE SIDE WHICH PROVIDES THAT

BOSUN CHAIRS
ROLLER BUMPERS

j

•

•

WIRE ROPES
WIRE ROPES

LESSEE HAS INSPECTED "LEASED EQUIPMENT ," AMD Wll 1
CONTINUE TO INSPECT IT (PARAGRAPH 3).

WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED I
(SEE PARAGRAPH 5)
'

I
|

WIRE ROPES TIEBACKS
ELECTRIC CABLES
ELECTRIC CABLES

1 • LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15)

|

ELECTRIC YOKES
•
ELECTRIC 110 ADAPTERS

SKY CLIMBER GUARD RAIL POSTS
GUARD RAILS
GUARD RAILS

LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE WIT
SAFETY REGULATIONS BY ALL PERSONS (PARAGRAPH 16)

[ • L E S S E E HAS RECEIVED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, IS
FAMILIAR WITH EQUIPMENTS SAFE USE, AND WILL MAKE
SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS AVAILABLE AT JOB LOCA
j
TION (PARAGRAPH 16) X
/ / /

l

\\

SIGNATURE

AND OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS — READ IT!
J-CLAMPS
THIMBLES
SHACKLES

CORNICE HOOKS
PARAPET CLAMPS
ALUM " 1 " BEAMS

I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE
AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
RECEIPT BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER
OR OTHER AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY
CONSTITUTE LESSEE'S AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE
PARAGRAPH 20).

t //

RECEIPT OF ABOVE EQUIPMENT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED

/

STEEL " 1 " BEAMS
LONGHORN ASSEMBLY
COUNTERWEIGHTS

M,,

• LESSEE OR AUTHORIZED AGENT

ALUMINUM PLANK

/

0U1.

ALUMINUM PLANK

ALL EQUIPMENT USED AT YOUR O W N RISK

t'KJIPMENT DG£h

fc

W

» K Ph . t h

tMfTH^i^i

T

*

NCE.

SKY CLIMBER RENTAL DELIVERY
SCAFFOLD

SAVAGE /Scoff old & Equipment Co.
728 West 2nd South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
phone

Sales and Rental

(«>l) 359-8635

Leased to

EXHIBIT

nrf-Tv
^*£gg
ssocikroN
NO. 1940

"A"

Date

Address

,

Job Number
Customer's Order No.

Job

This Agreement Terminates: Date_

Ship Via

Vehicle License Number

DESCRIPTION

RECEIVED

RETURNED

SERIAL NUMBER

19_

IMPORTANT
Count equipment received. Customer liable for
eauipment not returned.
HANDLE WIRE ROPE PROPERLY CUSTOMER WILL BE
CHARGED FOR THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF WIRE ROPE IF
ANY PART IS DAMAGED.
CAUTION: SET FOR
VOLTS
USE ONLY » 10-3 ELECTRIC CABLE
D LIFE LINES AND SAFETY BELTS DECLINED WILL
SUPPLY OWN EQUIPMENT.
__^/___

SKY CLIMBERS
POWER CLIMBERS
LAHOS
SKY LOCKS

STIRRUPS

INITIAL

WORK CAGES
DEMOUNTABLE WORK CAGES

SEE REVERSE SIDE WHICH PROVIDES THAT

BOSUN CHAIRS
LESSEE HAS INSPECTED "LEASED EQUIPMENT" AND WILL
CONTINUE TO INSPECT IT (PARAGRAPH 3)

ROLLER BUMPERS

WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED
(SEE PARAGRAPH 5)

WIRE ROPES
WIRE ROPES
WIRE ROPES TIEBACKS
•

LESSEE WILL REPORT ALL ACCIDENTS (PARAGRAPH 6)

•

LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15)

ELECTRIC CABLES
ELECTRIC CABLES
ELECTRIC YOKES
ELECTRIC 110 ADAPTERS

SKY CLIMBER GUARD RAIL POSTS
GUARD RAILS
GUARD RAILS

LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
SAFETY REGULATIONS BY ALL PERSONS (PARAGRAPH 16)
LESSEE HAS RECEIVED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, IS
FAMILIAR WITH EQUIPMENT'S SAFE USE, AND WILL MAKE
SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS AVAILABLE AT JOB LOCATION (PARAGRAPH 16) X
• /
SIGNATURE

AND OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS — READ IT!
J-CLAMPS
THIMBLES
SHACKLES

CORNICE HOOKS
PARAPET CLAMPS
ALUM " I " BEAMS

I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE
AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
RECEIPT BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER
OR OTHER AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY
CONSTITUTE LESSEE'S AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE
PARAGRAPH 20).
' /
RECEIPT OF ABOVE EQUIPMENT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED

STEEL " I " BEAMS
LONGHORN ASSEMBLY

Count Accepted By

5533
SIGNATURE OF LESSEE OR AUTHORIZED AGENT

COUNTERWEIGHTS

ALUMINUM PLANK

00111
Checked By_

GIVE TO SCAFFOLD ERECTOR & USER OR POST ON JOB
DEVELOPED FOR INDUSTRY BY

SCAFFOLD INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, INC.
CODE OF SAFE PRACTICES
FOR

SUSPENDED POWERED SCAFFOLDS
It shall be the responsibility of all employees and users to read and comply with the following common sense rules which are designed to
promote safety in the erection and use of suspended powered scaffolds. These rules do not purport to be all inclusive nor to supplant or
replace other additional safety and precautionary measures to cover usual or unusual conditions. If these rules conflict in any way with any
state, local or federal statute or regulation, said statute or regulation shall supersede these rules and it shall be the responsibility of each
employee and user to comply therewith.

A.

GENERAL RULES:
1. POST THESE SAFETY RULES at every job site in a conspicuous place and make certain that all persons who will erect,
use, relocate, or dismantle suspended svstems are fullv aware of them and other governing codes.
2. READ, UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOW THESE RULES and manufacturers' instructions located in manuals supplied with and
on plates posted on scaffolding equipment.
3. CONSULT YOUR SUSPENDED POWER SCAFFOLD EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER when in doubt.
4. OPERATE SAFELY —NEVER TAKE CHANCES.
5. When using traction type hoisting machines make sure
that the wire rope is long enough to reach from the
highest point of support to the lowest point of building
structure plus rigging reeving lengths as defined in the
hoisting machine manufacturer's instructions.
6. When using drum wrapping hoisting machines make
sure that at least four wraps remain on the drum at the
lowest point of descent, and the end of the rope is
securely attached to the drum.
7. On two point suspension scaffolds make sure that the
stirrups are directly under the suspension points.

B. EQUIPMENT:
1.
2.
34.
5.
6.

Use only suspended scaffolding system and personal
safety equipment designed for the specific job operation.
Use equipment only in manner specified by equipment
manufacturers.
Never use equipment that does not function properly.
Clean and maintain equipment as specified by equipment manufacturer. Contact supplier for required service.
Never alter, remove or substitute components of a
scaffold system.
Make sure that platforms have toeboards, rails and
other enclosure items which meet governing
requirements, and are properly installed and secured.

E. WIRE ROPE:
1. Use only the wire rope and fittings specified by the
hoisting machine manufacturer.
Use the number of wire rope clamps and tighten clamps
in accordance with hoisting machine manufacturer's
instructions. Before commencing work operations,
preload wire rope with maximum work load, then
retighten clamps to manufacturer's torque specifications. Check clamp tightening daily.
3. Inspect wire rope for damage daily. Do not use kinked,
bird-caged, corroded, undersize, or damaged wire rope.
4. Clean and lubricate wire rope in accordance with
manufacturer's instructions.
5. Handle wire rope with care — coil and uncoil properly.
Do not drop coiled or uncoiled wire rope on ground
from any height.
6. Do not expose wire rope to fire, undue heat, corrosive
atmosphere or chemicals, to passage of electrical
currents.
7. When welding on suspended scaffolds protect the wire
rope from the welding torch or electrode. Make sure
the platform is grounded and stray electrical currents
cannot pass thru the suspension rope to ground thru
the upper rope support or by contact of the rope with
building structure or the ground.

C. INSPECTION:

2.

1. Inspect all suspension and operators' safety equipment,
before installation, each day before use and after moving to new drop location, for damage and that it meets
manufacturer's operational performance and safety
standards.
2. Inspect wire rope each ascent and descent to insure that
it has not been damaged.

D. INSTALLATION:
1. Safe rigging installation is your responsibility.
2. Roof irons, hooks, parapet clamps, outrigger beams, or
other rope supporting devices shall be capable of carrying the maximum applied loads with a safety factor of
not less than 4:1. The strength of the building or structure to which such equipment is to be attached or on
which it will rest, must be verified by a competent person prior to installation.
3. Tiebacks having strength equivalent to the hoisting
ropes shall be installed without slack at right angles to
the building and be firmly secured to a structurally
sound portion of the structure. This structure shall
have the capability of supporting the maximum
suspended load with a safety factor of not less than 4;1.
In the event that the tieback cannot be installed at
right angles to the structure face, two tiebacks,
without slack, shall be attached to each rope supporting device to prevent movement in any direction.
4. When outrigger beams are used for rope support, the
inner end shall be restrained against vertical movement so that the beam is capable of supporting safely
the maximum applied rope load with a safety factor of
not less than 4:1. If counter-weights are used for beam
restraint, they shall be of a non-flowable material, shall
carry a weight value and be securely fastened to the
beam.

F.

SAFETY:
1. Always use safety belts attached by shortest effective
lanyards and rope grabbing device to lifeline rigged to a
separate building support point capable of carrying
loads defined in governing regulations.
2. When working or riding on suspended scaffolds maintain the lanyard attachment to the lifeline at the
highest point compatible with work movement.
3. The weight of men, work materials and components
mounted on the scaffold must not exceed the manufacturer's rated loads.
4. Two or more scaffolds must not be combined into one
by lapping platforms on one stirrup.
5. Do not overload the support rope.

00112
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SUSPENDED SCAFFOLD
RE-OPERATION C H E C K - O " US'

IT IS EXPECTED THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY TRAINED
BEFORE VCU CAN BE ASKED TO FOLLOW TH!S CHECK-OFF LIST

u p ; ^ - o r - C - i E M r S - Cont'd.
'•-• '(•..-• : s applied. 3l: tatings ^o^^ oeO''1 checked a- tioh;oess
a o K a ic :! cable cr air hose connections have been inspected ana
a ?a" -.":. Strain :"^i!?f has bean provided
*? :'••. • • .' to he asec is aoeaoare 'or the hoist and distance >rcm 'be

a~c:1 ' r r j u s t r . ' •'•" ?«.:•• "ic-.tion
>rf

4.n_... ...^

: n

^

?nt,*V.j

S-Ji — CRT SA'STLiM
• roe s'n.; aa^-- >~ sun-ae- te .support - h o :0?
» The ;;c-!-o*:'-. •••>? »ooe 3 idequaioh a-an ioa:t.'d
• Tr.r- 0Li''']pc .J ot riT?e»' design a.oa ^ ar-~a!y "ssembi.-d
• foe numner of aoun'e'V/e:g'-ts are nb~au ae fa' *he overhsr.;} lend
• Al< ^ - a r - a r:-;-r^c" a a ocoks are adoou-" 0 !*/ v -d ba :k
• Sc::<et:: aid aavifc >re ocn-eci!y s e a l e d

* ' a ;;.-..; s jcrr-.-ct'y attached to the stirrup
FALL ^ h F E S T SYSTEM
MGTc: ivJo person shall enter a stage / cage
paraco nav " a o o k e d - u p " in a safe manner,
* r.' 'ch ^.T'iOf to as-1 m^ c teae

SUSPENSION UNIT
» A1 ecrneonenls rails, 'anas deck. bumoe r ol' 5. v-:V!s. "avasctic''
f
oe aoa"bs aaardra;'a stanchions'; of 'he sraor, eaae o-e'r aave
been oh .'Ckf-"j 'c o rvaae they are sauna and W'{' r , o f .veak or r^-me
iccse
• T f e stlanos o. conn rations and the" com pent, a is have been checked
f
c ensure th>-v are safe
• The cacacitv iJentifioaticr. shews the m a ^ m u m 'oae and ;t vil! not be
;3
xceeoed
• T i•••; -?tese >u:?ceiiSiOH cants are in iee with She rco; sacpod?
HOiST COMPONENTS

chair unless aach

once ' chair has ti• ar ova mdecenaent

• E..-0-' --.-'I'hj.'C lite Sne has been totally shocked 'or -are asa and s
:C're::!v ^-ai-inatrd at an 'ndeaeido'a . r-itfe anchor - c o 1 "t rco: !a.<^
Foot - o r e prc'actioc has {z-^'} c o v d e d
• E-tca aa: c- grab has been ch^c:< -.J ?cr o^rrec* operation j,- ; d instailaiion
• Eacli fad! body harness or belt has been thoroughly checked f o ensure
that a!' corriDonents are safe
» E?^ ! aryard has been thoroughly checked for safe condition. The cooaO'.nants are sound and correctly attached to the rope grab and D ring a*
the :onio<- of the back
* The body names 3 or h,ci|f is l i e proper size and fits •x?rrect'y and is
-noa x> 'he -cdy

-;ad and under3er operating :oncit'cn
- nave ! oca:\ c , o maii-tenanco too v ? ;r
nr! e : n.Tit» d to
^tee' .a-e ace -i.:s been ' u r o ^ r o c . ;•;.•.--•
•".' p: ae: .tnd ana :j':8
:
-: *c/'h of jiee: ,v!'-» rape is suffieior.* 'o reaa' ;l a- ""round and is
oat-d :-~' vne : c - 'upport ano excevs :rnp'-r-y coited at 'r\ a ground

ADOIT!Orj;\L RESPONSIBILITIES
• Ti^e i-iqippaasnl nu;at be kepJ c:ear of power sources and oostacles
• The -quiUKrvait ^ a s t not be used Ir adve r se wea*he r conditions
* Tho ro!ai r: 'oira "^ost be chocked each time you use :r rnovo u
• Aiv/ayo an -.-mbftr a.ci to overload the equipment
- 'r-n^dia-'e
-aoor any indication ot improper operation
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Defendants.

s
indenr

I K

S C a *•* r n 1 (j i n a

vy ;*

I e 1 s e ('

K.1

^v

u*u

'.UC

e
'i a t

a

f

consequent
t

luerc.

.

c. -

t

-

Id
•

s

-

>r

CIlI C O I l l C j J

,

^

,

v. o i l *

j j i i u l l

. i n t »- , » -

P

L_i__

1983) .
7'^

-

. . . . .

p ro\ i s ion s

:a

m n i M ' p r o v i s i o n i n q u e s t i o n i s i I c . i r mini n n a m b - g u o u
H I ' " ' C 1' l 1 Jill I I C ,"„

,1 III " '

1 III III II I II! , 1 II

Jil III II II | J i . l II III " »

I

I. I I I III

f

BOYD V. SIMPLOT

For

PAGE TAD

the foregoing

MINUTE ENTRY

reasons, defendant Savage's Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted.
DATED this

\jf__

day of September, 1993.

fl
Michael R. Murphy
District Court Judge

RM\I

'

PA<il' THRFF.

IMI'I I II

MINUTE ENTRY

vtAH iv4TJ CERTIFICATE
I h e r eb y c e r t i f y
...
ilnl i iiuc nnd v. ..v.; ..... . . . e
foregoing Minute Entry, postage pi^paid, to the following on this
day of September, '993.
Daniel Bay Gibbons
KIRTCN, M X C N K I E & POELMATS
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-1104
Mark D. Dunn
DUNN & DUNN
230 South 500 _ , . ,
Salt Lake Ci ty Utah

I

David R. King
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorney for Defendant Simplot
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 Wes t Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Scott W. Christensen
HANSON, EPPERSCN & SMITH
Attorney for Defendant Savage Scaffold
4 Triad Center, Sui te 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
David w. v^aii trill
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN &. KING
P. O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho
8370x

TabC

Peter C. Collins (#0700)
John W. Holt (#5720)
WINDER £ HASLAMf P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite #4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
ROBERT J. KANE, JR. and
BEVERLY KANE,
Plaintiffs,

:
:
:
:

-v-

:

J. R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, a
Nevada corporation, and
SAVAGE SCAFFOLD & EQUIPMENT,
INC*, a Utah corporation,

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Jury Demand Renewed)

Civil No, 92-C-234S
Judge David Sam

:

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, and as and for
their Amended Complaint, complain of defendants and allege as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Robert J. Kane, Jr. and Beverly Kane are

husband and wife and residents and citizens of the State of
Delaware.
2.

Defendant J. R. Simplot Company ("Simplot") is a

Nevada corporation and a corporate resident and citizen of a
state other than the State of Utah, with its principal place of
business in the State of Idaho; Simplot has, at all times

material hereto, (1) transacted substantial business within the
State of Utah; and (2) contracted to supply goods and/or
services in the State of Utah*
3.

Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. ("Sav-

age") is a Utah corporation and a corporate resident and
citizen of the State of Utah, with its principal place of
business located in the State of Utah.
4.

The matter in controversy herein exceeds the value of

$50,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.
5.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1332(a).
6.

Venue is properly laid in this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1391.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence of Defendant Simplot)
7.

Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-

rate, in this First Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs 1
through 6.
8.

At the time of the subject accident (which occurred

on July 5, 1991) and for a substantial period of time prior
thereto, defendant Simplot owned and/or otherwise controlled
real property located in Burley, Idaho, on which were located
improvements including grain silos owned and operated by
defendant Simplot.

2

9.

On July 5, 1991, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was

working in the employ of an entity that is not a party to this
suit, in connection with a contract with defendant Simplot to
paint some or all of defendant Simplot's silos located on the
subject property.
10.

In connection with and in the course of his said

employment, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was, on July 5, 1991,
and for a period of weeks prior thereto, participating in the
painting of the said silos.
11.

Plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was, in connection with

his said employment, on July 5, 1991, and for a period of weeks
prior thereto, a business invitee of defendant Simplot, and, as
such, was a person to whom defendant Simplot owed (1) the duty
of reasonable care, including the duty to keep the subject
premises reasonably safe in connection with plaintiff Robert J.
Kane, Jr.'s presence on, use of, and work on the subject
premises; and (2) the duties of refraining from allowing the
subject premises to become and to remain unsafe, in connection
with plaintiff Robert J. Kane's presence on, use of, and work
on the subject premises.
12.

In connection with the painting of one of the said

silos ("the subject silo") plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. and
his boss and co-worker, one Bruce Boyd, utilized a scaffolding
device which was suspended by two cables attached to structures
located on the top of the subject silo.

3

13.

Defendant Simplotf beginning at a time presently

unknown to plaintiffs and continuing through the time of the
subject accident, by and through one or more of its agents,
negligently breached its aforesaid duties to plaintiff Robert
J. Kane, Jr., by, inter alia, (1) allowing a certain catwalk to
become and remain unsafely and unsecurely affixed to the top of
the subject silo; (2) failing adequately to warn plaintiff
Robert J. Kane, Jr. of the danger inherent in working on the
subject scaffolding device while it was suspended from the
catwalk; (3) permitting one of the supporting cables of the
subject scaffolding device to become and remain attached to
that catwalk, when and while Simp lot knew or should have known
that that catwalk was not securely affixed to the subject silo
and was unsafe for use as a structure from which scaffolding
devices such as the subject scaffolding device might be suspended; and (4) allowing workers, including plaintiff Robert J.
Kane, Jr., to work on the subject scaffolding device while it
was suspended from the subject catwalk.
14.

Defendant Simplot, by and through one or more of its

agents, knew or should have known that one or more workers,
including plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr., might be, would
reasonably be expected to be, would be, and/or was or were in
fact working on the subject scaffolding device while the
subject scaffolding device was suspended from the subject
catwalk.

4

15.

On July 5, 1991, as plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was

engaged in employment activities in connection with the painting of the silo, and while plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was
standing on the subject scaffolding device (while it was
suspended from the said catwalk) , the said catwalk was, as a
proximate result of Simplot's negligence, suddenly pulled loose
from the top of the silo, causing plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.
to fall approximately 60 feet to the ground.
16.

As further proximate results of the negligence of

defendant Simplot, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. has suffered
severe, serious, debilitating, disfiguring and permanent bodily
injuries; he suffered substantial physical, mental and emotional pain and suffering; has suffered substantial inconvenience
in, loss of, and diminution of enjoyment of various life
activities; has suffered lost income to date in an amount to be
proved at trial; has incurred medical and related expenses to
date in an amount to be proved at trial; will, in the future,
incur substantial additional medical and related expenses and
substantial additional loss of income and earning capacity; and
will, in the future, suffer substantial mental, emotional, and
physical pain and suffering, continuing substantial impairment
and disability, continuing substantial inconvenience in, loss
of, and diminution of enjoyment of various life activities

—

all to his damage in amounts, substantially greater than
$500,000.00 for his special damages and substantially greater

5

than $500,000.00 for his general damages, to be determined by
the jury herein.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Strict Liability of Defendant Savage)
17.

Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-

rate, in this Second Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs
1-16.
18.

Defendant Savage has, at all times material hereto,

been engaged in the business of the provision, sale, and rental
(to contractors, subcontractors, and others) of scaffolding
equipment and systems.
19.

Prior to the subject accident, defendant Savage

provided, sold, and rented, from its Salt Lake City business
premises, to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.7s aforesaid boss and
co-worker, Bruce Boyd, the subject scaffolding equipment and
system (including but not limited to the aforesaid scaffolding
device) used in connection with painting of defendant Simplot's
subject silo.
20.

The subject scaffolding equipment and system, and/or

one or more component parts thereof, as designed and sold
and/or rented by Savage to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.'s said
boss and co-worker, was, at all times and in all respects
material hereto, when it left defendant Savage's possession,
the time of the subject accident, and at all intervening times,
in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to its
users, including plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.
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21.

The defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of

the subject scaffolding equipment and system included but was
not limited to the failure to include adequate warnings and
instructions regarding the use of the subject scaffolding
equipment and system; and the design of the subject scaffolding
equipment and system, which made it virtually impossible and,
from plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.'s perspective, unsafe, for
plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. to do the silo painting work
which he was doing when the subject incident occurred, without
unhooking from his "safety line," which was an integral part of
the subject scaffolding equipment and system.
22.

The subject scaffolding equipment and system was used

for the purposes for which it was intended and was not altered
from the time it left defendant Savage's possession through the
time of the subject accident.
23.

As proximate results of defendant Savage's said

provision, sale, and rental of the subject scaffolding equipment and system, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. has suffered and
sustained the injuries and damages described hereinabove; and
defendant Savage is strictly liable in tort, to plaintiff
Robert J. Kane, Jr., in the amount of damages proved at trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence of Defendant Savage)
24.

Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-

rate, in this Third Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs
1-23.
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25.

Defendant Savage owed to persons including plaintiff

Robert J. Kane, Jr. a duty of reasonable care in connection
with the design of and in connection with the provision,
rental, and sale, to the said Bruce Boyd, of the subject scaffolding equipment and system and in connection with the giving
of instructions and directions and warnings regarding the use
thereof.
26.

Defendant Savage in a negligent manner and in breach

of its duty to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. designed and
provided, rented and sold the subject scaffolding equipment and
system to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.'s aforesaid boss and
co-worker, Bruce Boyd.
27.

Defendant Savage was also negligent and also breached

its duty to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. by reason of and in
connection with its failure adequately to direct, instruct, and
warn the said Boyd and plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. with
respect to the dangers inherent in, and with respect to the
proper method for, the use of the subject scaffolding equipment
and system.
28.

As proximate results of defendant Savage's negli-

gence, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. has suffered and sustained
the injuries and damages described herein above; and defendant
Savage is liable in negligence, to plaintiff Robert J. Kane,
Jr., in the amount of damages proved at trial.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Plaintiff Beverly Kane's Loss of Consortium)
29.

Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-

rate, in this Fourth Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs
1-28.
30.

Defendants owed plaintiff Beverly Kane legal duties

like the duties they owed to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.; by
virtue of the acts and omissions referenced and complained of
hereinabove, they breached those duties and thereby caused
plaintiff Beverly Kane to suffer damage to and loss of consortium with her husband, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.
31.

As further proximate results of defendants' acts and

omissions referenced and complained of hereinabove, plaintiff
Beverly Kane has been substantially and permanently damaged, by
reason of and in connection with her loss of consortium with
her husband, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr., and in connection
with all legally relevant aspects of that loss of consortium,
including but not limited to loss of and diminution of companionship, society and affection, and loss of and diminution of
enjoyment of various aspects of her relationship with her
husband, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr., all to her damages, in
a substantial and reasonable amount, to be determined by the
jury herein.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants
as follows:
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1.

As and for their special damages, in reasonable and

substantial amounts, substantially in excess of $500,000.00, to
be proved at the trial hereof and determined by the jury
herein;
2.

As and for their general damages, in substantial and

reasonable amounts, substantially in excess of $500,000.00, to
be proved at the trial hereof and determined by the jury
herein;
3.

For all allowable interest, at the maximum statutory

or other rate or rates, on their damages;
4.

For their just costs of court incurred herein; and

5.

For such other and further relief as the Court in its

discretion deems just^nd proper.
DATED this &Z-~9<
c*-~**- ddav of October, 1992.
WINDER &THASI^M, P.C.

Peter C. Collins
John W. Holt
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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RECEIVED
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SLC CLAIMS

RENEWAL OF JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, hereby renew
their demand for trial by jury herein.
DATED this <gK^"*C day of October, 1992,
WINDER/^/fevSlSfcK, P.C.
By.
Peter C. Collins
John W. Holt
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATB^OF MAILING
I certify that on the

S

day of October, 1992, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Complaint (Jury Demand Renewed) to be mailed first class, postage
pre-paid to:
Daniel A. Miller, Esq.
J. R. Simplot Company
One Capital Center
999 Main Street, Suite 13 00
Post Office Box 27
Boise, Idaho 83707
David R. King, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David W. Cantrill, Esq.
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING
1423 Tyrell Lane
Post Office Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701

22SZ\FEDJ>MC
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